Daoist Metaethics

  • Jason DockstaderEmail author

Moral Error Theory and the ‘Now What’ Problem

Moral facts entail intrinsically prescriptive, inescapably authoritative, irreducibly normative, mind-independent, and objective categorical reasons for action. Moral anti-realism is the view that moral facts do not exist. One can arrive at this view in two ways. One can deny both that we hold genuine moral beliefs and that morality is a truth-apt discourse. Since we are expressing other mental states and not using a discourse in the business of aiming to report the facts when uttering moral judgments, there can be no moral facts to which our moral judgments correspond. This combination of psychological non-cognitivism, semantic non-factualism, and ontological anti-realism is often called moral expressivism. The other way to arrive at moral anti-realism is by retaining a cognitivist view of moral psychology and factualist view of moral semantics while still concluding moral facts do not exist. This view is moral error theory. It says we...

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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University College CorkCorkIreland

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