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Information flows and social capital through linkages: the effectiveness of the CLRTAP network

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Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of the convention on long-range transboundary air pollution (CLRTAP) from a network perspective. The authors claim, contrary to most existing research, that we must consider all links and connections that a regime creates among its members for determining whether and how it influences states toward ‘greener’ environmental behavior. To this extent, the paper advances two arguments. First, parties more central to the CLRTAP network can rely on and signal mutual interests, shared preferences, and decreased uncertainty with all actors involved. In turn, a central position embodies social capital, which facilitates that a well-connected state is ceteris paribus more likely to cooperate with the regime. Second, if other countries in the network do not cooperate, however, it is likely that the positive effect stemming from social capital disappears and that a state will defect even if it has a central position in the network. The authors’ empirical analysis provides support for the theory and may have important implications for studies on regime effectiveness and on networks in general.

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Notes

  1. For example, we do not consider satellite states such as Belarus before its independence in 1991.

  2. Concerns may arise due to this technique for addressing missing values. We return to this issue below.

  3. With regard to trade openness, Copeland and Taylor (2003) demonstrate that its effect on our dependent variables could be either positive or negative, depending on the specific nature of exports and imports. Thus, these effects potentially cancel each other out leading to the insignificance of the variable in our models. With regard to democracy score, our results are likely to be explained by our strategies for correcting any problems stemming from the panel structure of the data. Put differently, fixed effects models lack the ability to make inferences about time-invariant or slow-moving variables, because those covariates are highly collinear with fixed effects and their coefficients are either not identified or difficult to estimate with precision (see Plümper and Troeger 2007). And even despite some outliers, democracy score is in fact hardly changing over time.

  4. Although 3SLS works as an acceptable robustness check, we refrained from using it as the preferred model of choice because of sample constraints: The 3SLS estimator is consistent, yet biased in relatively small samples (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

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Acknowledgments

This article has been written in the context of the Swiss National Research Program on Democracy in the twenty-first century. We thank Thomas Bernauer, and the anonymous reviewers as well as the editor of International Environmental Agreements for useful comments. The replication materials for the data analysis can be obtained upon request.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Environmental Decisions (IED), Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), ETH Zurich, Haldenggsteig 4, 8092, Zurich, Switzerland

    Tobias Böhmelt & Jürg Vollenweider

  2. Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

    Tobias Böhmelt

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  1. Tobias Böhmelt
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  2. Jürg Vollenweider
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Correspondence to Tobias Böhmelt.

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Böhmelt, T., Vollenweider, J. Information flows and social capital through linkages: the effectiveness of the CLRTAP network. Int Environ Agreements 15, 105–123 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9218-1

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