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International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics volume 8, Article number: 389 (2008) Cite this article

Abstract

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There is a GEF (Global Environmental Facility) project that involves joint management of environmental resources in the Pantanal wetland by Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay, but no treaty was signed (ANA 2006).

  2. 2.

    Comparison between Brazil and Uruguay (population, GDP and area). Source: (Secretary of State, 2007 with 2006 data unless noted):—Brazil: 188 million inhabitants; GDP: $943 billion; 8.5 million km2—Uruguay: 3.3 million inhabitants (57 times less than Brazil); GDP: 16.8 billion (2005) (56.1 times less); 176 thousand km2 (48 times less).

  3. 3.

    Haas et al. (1993) have a different definition based on the effectiveness of international institutions, but this definition is not applicable in the Brazil–Uruguay case because there was no process of institution building.

  4. 4.

    At that time, Brazil was under a military dictatorship (1964–1985).

  5. 5.

    Senator Luis Alberto Lacalle, who later became president (1990–1995).

  6. 6.

    Grupo Cerro Largo Pró Condiciones de Vida (Cerro Largo Quality of Life Defense Group).

  7. 7.

    The UTPM was located in the municipality of Bagé until 1992, when Candiota seceded to become a new municipality.

  8. 8.

    Brazil had a military coup in 1964, with the military dictatorship lasting for almost 21 years until 1985. In Uruguay, the military regime was from 1973 until 1985.

  9. 9.

    In 1992, both governments signed another agreement, the Brazil-Uruguay Environmental Cooperation Treaty, but we will discuss only the Act of Jaguarão in this paper because it had explicit objectives, such as the joint monitoring program.

  10. 10.

    DINAMA (Dirección Nacional de Medio Ambiente) is the Uruguayan Evironmental Agency.

  11. 11.

    IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis) is the Federal Environmental Agency and was created in 1989. IBAMA united the functions of four other Brazilian governmental bodies.

  12. 12.

    The Act of Jaguarão determined two phases of the joint monitoring program. In the first phase, it planned to develop joint studies about wind directions. Those studies were implemented by the University Pelotas in Brazil. It also determined the need for joint studies on pH analyses of river water and human mortality in the region. In the second phase, the Act of Jaguarão recommended a few other activities, such as: (a) implementation of a Regional Network Monitoring Plan in six months (which was never implemented); (b) implementation of water-quality monitoring plan; and (c) analyses of atmospheric pollutants and their socioeconomic and ecological impacts.

  13. 13.

    Mercosul in Portuguese (or Mercosur in Spanish). It has as full members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is negotiating its membership to become a full member. Chile and Bolivia participate as associate members.

  14. 14.

    According to Brazilian Environmental Law, facilities bordering foreign countries (within 150 km) are subject to federal control.

  15. 15.

    The federal environmental agency originally involved in the process was the National Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA). SEMA was incorporated into IBAMA in 1989.

  16. 16.

    DINAMA was subordinated to the Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning, and Environment.

  17. 17.

    Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay mentioned in an interview that DINAMA developed a significant capacity to negotiate international environmental issues because of the UTPM issue.

  18. 18.

    After the first monitoring phase, Uruguay was not completely satisfied with the results regarding technical aspects. The second round of negotiations stalled over a technical impasse and the technical officials of both countries could not reach an agreement on the best way to continue the monitoring program. As a result, they decided to implement independent monitoring systems on their own. The discontinuation of joint monitoring could be explained by the loss of public and governmental interest in the matter, and the subsequent failure to solve the technical impasse. Moreover, the context also changed. Uruguayan officials had improved their technical capacity and wanted to go it alone. In Brazil, the Rio-92 Earth Summit was over, UTPM control was transferred from the state government of Rio Grande do Sul to the Federal Government, and the new priority was to construct Candiota III with private capital to increase energy production. Thus, there was no longer any interest in raising sensitive environmental issues.

  19. 19.

    According to the leaders of the NGO, its funding from IDRC ended and they lost interest in continuing the debate on the acid rain issue.

  20. 20.

    In 1999, dwellers of Treinta y Tres in Uruguay said that there was a ‘black rain’ in the region, potentially from the UTPM, but it could not be scientifically detected.

  21. 21.

    Technicians from the environmental agencies of both countries mentioned in interviews that politicians “hurt more than help.”

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Affiliations

  1. Department of International Studies, School of Administration and Social Sciences, ORT Uruguay University, Bvar. España 2633, room 13-2, CEP 11300, Montevideo, Uruguay

    Daniel Enrique Rótulo Decuadra

  2. University College London, London, UK

    Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira

  3. University of Santiago de compostela, Santiago de compostela, Spain

    Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira

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  1. Daniel Enrique Rótulo Decuadra
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Correspondence to Jose Antonio Puppim de Oliveira.

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Rótulo Decuadra, D.E., Puppim de Oliveira, J.A. International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain. Int Environ Agreements 8, 389 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-008-9084-4

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Keywords

  • Air Pollution
  • Environmental agreements
  • Bilateral agreement
  • Implementation
  • Transboundary pollution
  • Uruguay
  • Brazil
  • Mercosul
  • Mercosur
  • Latin America
  • Bilateral negotiation
  • Developing countries