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The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view

  • Udo Schneider
  • Volker Ulrich
Article

Abstract

The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond controversy. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information relationship between physician and patient. In contrast to most work looking only at the physician’s perspective, our paper concentrates on the patient’s view. Estimation results support the hypotheses that physician consultation and health relevant behavior are not stochastically independent. In the recursive bivariate probit model, patient’s health relevant behavior has a significant influence on the probability of a physician visit. This means that health care demand and not only the contact decision is determined by both, patient and physician.

Keywords

Physician-patient relationship Health behavior Bivariate probit panel 

JEL Classifications

I12 C33 D82 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Law and Economics, Institute of Public FinanceUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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