Advertisement

Human Studies

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 199–216 | Cite as

Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality

  • P. Sven ArvidsonEmail author
Theoretical / Philosophical Paper
First Online:

Abstract

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl’s position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground.

Keywords

Attention Intentionality Gurwitsch Husserl Gestalt Index Multistable phenomena 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Arvidson, P. S. (2006). The sphere of attention: Context and margin. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  2. Arvidson, P. S. (2008). Attentional capture and attentional character. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 7, 539–562.Google Scholar
  3. Bégout, B. (2007). Husserl and the phenomenology of attention. In L. Boi, P. Kerszberg, & F. Patras (Eds.), Rediscovering phenomenology: Phenomenological essays on mathematical beings, physical reality, perception and consciousness (pp. 13–32). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Depraz, N. (2004). Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform? A transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention. Continental Philosophy Review, 37, 5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Depraz, N., Varela, F. J., & Vermersch, P. (2003). On becoming aware: A pragmatics of experiencing. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  6. Dwyer, D. (2007). Husserl’s appropriation of the psychological concepts of apperception and attention. Husserl Studies, 23, 83–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Embree, L. (2004). Preface. In L. Embree (Ed.), Gurwitsch’s relevancy for cognitive science. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Gallagher, S., & Sørensen, J. (2006). Experimenting with phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 119–134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Gilligan, C. (1987). Moral orientation and moral development. In E. F. Kittay & D. T. Myers (Eds.), Women and moral theory (pp. 19–36). Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
  10. Gurwitsch, A. (1964). The field of consciousness. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Gurwitsch, A. (1966). Studies in phenomenology and psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Horowitz, T. S., Klieger, S. B., Fencsik, D. E., Yang, K. K., Alvarez, G. A., & Wolfe, J. M. (2007). Tracking unique objects. Perception & Psychophysics, 69, 172–184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Husserl, E. (1970). Logical investigations (Vol. 1 & 2). Tr. J. Findlay. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  14. Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgment. In L. Landgrebe (Ed.), Trs. J.S. Churchill & K. Ameriks. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book. General introduction to a pure phenomenology. Tr. F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Husserl, E. (1987). Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908. Husserliana, Vol. 26. Ed. U. Panzer. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  17. Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic. Tr. A. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  18. Husserl, E. (2004). Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912). In T. Vongehr, & R. Giuliani (Eds.). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  19. Ihde, D. (1977). Experimental phenomenology. New York: Paragon.Google Scholar
  20. Kambe, G., Rayner, K., & Duffy, S. A. (2001). Global context effects on processing lexically ambiguous worlds: Evidence from eye fixations. Memory and Cognition, 29, 363–372.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Kanizsa, G. (1979). Organization in vision: Essays on Gestalt perception. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
  22. Kelso, J. A. S., Case, P., Holroyd, T., Horvath, E., Raczaszek, J., Tuller, B., et al. (1995). Multistability and metastability in perceptual and brain dynamics. In P. Kruse & M. Stadler (Eds.), Ambiguity in mind and nature (pp. 159–189). Heidelberg: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Koehler, W. (1940). Dynamics in psychology. New York: Liveright.Google Scholar
  24. Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.Google Scholar
  25. LaBerge, D. (1995). Attentional processing: The brain’s art of mindfulness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  26. Marder, M. (2009). What is living and what is dead in attention. Research in phenomenology, 39, 29–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science, 244, 933–938.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Olson, I., & Chun, M. M. (2001). Temporal contextual cuing of visual attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 1299–1313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Palmer, S. (1999). Vision science: From photons to phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  30. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2001). Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision. Cognition, 80, 127–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Pylyshyn, Z. (2003). Seeing and visualizing: It’s not what you think. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  32. Rawson, R., & Kintsch, W. (2002). How does background information improve memory for text content. Memory and Cognition, 30, 768–778.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Rensink, R. (2001). Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention. In M. Jenkin & L. Harris (Eds.), Vision and attention (pp. 169–187). New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Repko, A. (2012). Interdisciplinary research: Theory and process. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
  35. Repp, B. H., & Thompson, J. M. (2010). Context sensitivity and invariance in perception of octave-ambiguous tones. Psychological Research, 74, 436–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Ryan, W. F. (1977). Passive and active elements in Husserl’s notion of intentionality. The Modern Schoolman, 40, 37–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Scholl, B., Pylyshyn, Z. W., & Feldman, J. (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking. Cognition, 80, 159–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Sears, C. R., & Pylyshyn, Z. (2000). Multiple object tracking and attentional processing. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 54, 1–14.Google Scholar
  39. Sharps, M., & Martin, S. S. (2002). “Mindless” decision making as a failure of contextual reasoning. The Journal of Psychology, 136, 272–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Simons, D., Wang, R. F., & Roddenberry, D. (2002). Object recognition is mediated by extra retinal information. Perception & Psychophysics, 64, 521–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Sokolowski, R. (1981). Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Supplement to Philosophical Topics, 12, 127–141.Google Scholar
  42. Steinbock, A. (2004). Affection and attention: On the phenomenology of becoming aware. Continental Philosophy Review, 37, 21–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Theeuwes, J. (1994). Stimulus-driven capture and attentional set: Selective search for color and visual abrupt onsets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20, 799–806.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Theeuwes, J. (2004). Top-down search strategies cannot override attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 65–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330–350.Google Scholar
  46. Varela, F. (1999). Present time consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 405–428.Google Scholar
  47. Vermersch, P. (2004). Attention between phenomenology and experimental psychology. Continental Philosophy Review, 37, 45–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Waldenfels, B. (2004). Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit. Berlin: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
  49. Wright, E. (1992). Gestalt-switching: Hanson, Aronson, and Harre. Philosophy of science, 59, 480–486.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySeattle UniversitySeattleUSA

Personalised recommendations

Cite article

Buy options