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Husserl Studies

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 19–43 | Cite as

Representation and Regress

  • Maiya JordanEmail author
Article
  • 506 Downloads

Abstract

I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience.

Keywords

Conscious State Proper Part Intentional Object Intentional Content Almond Tree 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to the editors and to an anonymous referee for Husserl Studies. For their remarks on an earlier expression of these thoughts, thanks are due to Alia Al-Saji, Emily Carson, David Davies and Ian Gold.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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