Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 793–813 | Cite as

Recursive Monotonicity of the Scorix: Borda Meets Condorcet

Article
First Online:

Abstract

Back in the eighteenth century, the works of Borda and Condorcet laid the foundations of social choice theory. On the one hand, Borda proposed to exploit the positions at which each candidate is ranked. On the other hand, Condorcet proposed to exploit the relative positions of each pair of candidates. Both proposals have equally called the attention of the scientific community, leading to two diametrically opposed points of view of the theory of social choice. Here, we introduce the intuitive property of recursive monotonicity of the scorix, which will be proven to be a natural condition for Borda and Condorcet to agree. Furthermore, we propose a ranking rule that focuses on the search for recursive monotonicity of the scorix.

Keywords

Social choice Ranking rule Monotonicity Recursive monotonicity Scorix Monometric 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KERMIT, Department of Mathematical Modelling, Statistics and BioinformaticsGhent UniversityGhentBelgium

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