Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 921–936 | Cite as

Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining

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Abstract

We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way.

Keywords

Ultimatum game Vacuous information Experiment  Bargaining Self-serving bias Anchoring 

JEL Classification

C90 (Design of Experiments: Group Behavior) C78 (Bargaining) 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics VWL IVUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany
  2. 2.Institute of EconomicsKarlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)KarlsruheGermany

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