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Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 579–596 | Cite as

Social Planner’s Solution for the Caspian Sea Conflict

  • Kaveh Madani
  • Majid Sheikhmohammady
  • Soroush Mokhtari
  • Mojtaba Moradi
  • Petros Xanthopoulos
Article

Abstract

This paper evaluates the proposed alternatives for sharing the Caspian Sea from the social planner’s or systems-level perspective with respect to the stakeholders’ utilities from the oil and natural gas resources of the sea. Different multi-criteria decision-making methods, namely dominance, maximin, lexicography, simple additive weighting, and TOPSIS are applied to determine the social planner’s ranking of these alternatives. Results suggest the Condominium governance regime as the most promising division method. Bankruptcy rules and cooperative game theory methods can be considered as the other socially optimal resolutions to the conflict over sharing the Caspian Sea energy resources among its five littoral countries. Consideration of these methods in negotiations may help with resolving the existing deadlock, which has been in place for two decades.

Keywords

Conflict resolution Multi-criteria Decision-making Social planner Caspian Sea 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kaveh Madani
    • 1
  • Majid Sheikhmohammady
    • 2
  • Soroush Mokhtari
    • 1
  • Mojtaba Moradi
    • 3
  • Petros Xanthopoulos
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Civil, Environmental and Construction EngineeringUniversity of Central FloridaOrlandoUSA
  2. 2.Department of Industrial EngineeringTarbiat Modares UniversityTehranIran
  3. 3.Department of Industrial EngineeringK. N. Toosi University of TechnologyTehranIran
  4. 4.Department of Industrial Engineering and Management SystemsUniversity of Central FloridaOrlandoUSA

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