Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 21, Issue 5, pp 637–662 | Cite as

Symmetric Coalitional Binomial Semivalues

  • Francesc CarrerasEmail author
  • María Albina Puente


We introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the binomial semivalues to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and merge the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the original game is also provided and an application to political science is sketched.


Cooperative game Binomial semivalue Coalition structure Multilinear extension 

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000)



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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied Mathematics II and Industrial and Aeronautical Engineering School of TerrassaTechnical University of CataloniaCataloniaSpain
  2. 2.Department of Applied Mathematics III and Engineering School of ManresaTechnical University of CataloniaCataloniaSpain

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