Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp 165–183 | Cite as

The Accounting Standards Setting Process in the U.S.: Examination of the SEC–FASB Relationship

  • Dan Palmon
  • Marietta Peytcheva
  • Ari YezegelEmail author


In the U.S. there is a close relationship between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a governmental agency legally responsible for setting accounting standards, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private sector body to whom the SEC has delegated this responsibility. In this paper we examine the influence of the SEC on the FASB as evidenced by all major statements issued by the FASB. Minor statements, amendments, and strictly technical pronouncements were omitted because of their limited exposure to the political process. Our analysis reveals that the SEC applied substantial pressure on the FASB in the standard setting process and has not adopted a position of benign neglect.


Accounting standards setting process Group decision FASB U.S. Congress 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Lehigh UniversityBethlehemUSA
  3. 3.Bentley UniversityWalthamUSA

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