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Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 267–277 | Cite as

Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements

  • László Á. Kóczy
Article

Abstract

While the 1995 entrants to the EU are by now fully integrated, those joining in 2004 still “enjoy” a secondary status for a number of years. We attribute this difference to the fact that unlike the former EFTA members joining in 1995, the 2004 entrants formed a group with heterogenous interests, one that lacked the same strong internal economic ties. Not being able to act as a unified block they had a considerably weaker bargaining position. We support our arguments by qualitative results from a simple model, a dynamic partition function game based on Yi (Games Econ Behav 20:201–237, 1997) and Morelli and Penelle (Economic integration as a partition function game 1997).

Keywords

European integration Externalities Path dependence 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht University and Keleti Faculty of Economics, Budapest TechBudapestHungary

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