Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 77–107 | Cite as

Exploratory Analysis of Similarities Between Social Choice Rules

  • John C. McCabe-Dansted
  • Arkadii SlinkoEmail author


Nurmi (1987) investigated the relationship between voting rules by determining the frequency that two rules pick the same winner. We use statistical techniques such as hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling to further understand the relationships between rules. We use the urn model with a parameter representing contagion to model the presence of social homogeneity within the group of agents and investigate how the classification tree of the rules changes when the homogeneity of the voting population is increased. We discovered that the topology of the classification tree changes quite substantially when the parameter of homogeneity is increased from 0 to 1. We describe the most interesting changes and explain some of them. Most common social choice rules are included, 26 in total.


voting rule social choice rule social homogeneity Condorcet efficiency Pólya-Eggenberger distribution cluster analysis 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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