Journal of Grid Computing

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 225–237 | Cite as

A Framework for Trust and Reputation in Grid Environments

  • Torsten Eymann
  • Stefan KönigEmail author
  • Raimund Matros


This paper examines the role of trust and reputation in Grid environments. As Grid technology becomes standardized and stable, business models are invented and increasingly applied, and economic implications can be observed. Asymmetrically distributed information may allow for opportunistic behavior of service providers or users who opportunistically exploit the information gap between providers and consumers on the quality of services. The paper takes up these economic issues by proposing a reputation-based conceptual framework for enabling future open Grid markets, to recommend the most promising Grid architecture and a corresponding reputation approach in a particular case.


Grid economies Trust Reputation Framework Institutional economics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Chair of Information Systems ManagementUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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