GeoJournal

, Volume 75, Issue 5, pp 459–507 | Cite as

Resource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in Nigeria: the Niger Delta question

Article
First Online:

Abstract

The Niger Delta question represents one of the most intractable sources of political destabilization, constitutes a profound threat to national security, and economic development of the Nigerian state. Therefore, the study of the intricate dynamics among multinational oil corporations, the Nigerian State, and insurgent militias illuminates the root causes, societal schisms and the political economy of resource induced conflicts in Africa’s major oil producing nation state. This case study illustrates and explicates the “paradox of plenty”, the “resource curse”, the “shadow state syndrome”, and the debilitating effects of petroleum politics in Nigeria. Economic exploitation of the region’s vast crude oil reserves by multinationals and government authorities is juxtaposed with the specter of environmental devastation, excruciating poverty, and recurrent rule of impunity. National elite contestations concerning the legalities of resource control, internecine squabbles over revenue allocation formulas and derivation principles have been compounded by incessant disruptions of crude oil pipelines, necessitating drastic reduction in the country’s petroleum output and revenues derived from the global economy. Due to the multi-layered dimensions of the effects of crude oil, guns, profits, and geo-territorial instability, the protracted problems of the Niger Delta thus, provides us with pertinent analytical and contextual frameworks for the study of the dynamics, volatility and transparency issues in global extractive industries. In the muddled rivers and creeks of the Niger Delta, characterized by regional destabilization, there has emerged a clandestine economy of protection syndicates, marked exponential increase in kidnappings and targeting of expatriate workers, as well as state sponsored military reprisals against self-styled insurgents, warlords, and militia movements.

Keywords

MEND Ethnic militias Land Use Act Surveillance contract Host community Revenue derivation formula Oil bunkering Onshore/offshore dichotomy Force majeure Joint task force Resource control Fiscal federalism Environmental degradation Oil Pipeline Act 

Abbreviations

EITI

Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative

MOSOP

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

NDDC

Niger Delta Development Commission

NDVF

Niger Delta Volunteer Force

SSS

State Security Service

CSR

Corporate Social Responsibility

MEND

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

SPDC

Shell Petroleum Development Company

NDV

Niger Delta Vigilante

NDPVF

Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

COMA

Coalition of Military Action in the Niger Delta

EBA

Egbesu Boys of Africa

KD

Kaiama Declaration

NNPC

Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

MOPOL

Mobile Police

SALW

Small arms and light weapons

OMPADEC

Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission

SNC

Sovereign National Conference

JTF

Joint Task Force

IOCs

International oil corporations

IYC

Ijaw Youth Council

MND

Ministry of Niger Delta

NDPSF

Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front

NDSF

Niger Delta Strike Force

PDP

People’s Democratic Party

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation

OBR

Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990)

UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

PIB

Petroleum Industry Bill

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Supplementary material

10708_2009_9320_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (1.1 mb)
Supplementary material 1 (PDF 1111 kb)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Politics DepartmentLake Forest CollegeLake ForestUSA

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