Formal Methods in System Design

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 450–492 | Cite as

Verification and enforcement of access control policies

Article

Abstract

Access control mechanisms protect critical resources of systems from unauthorized access. In a policy-based management approach, administrators define user privileges as rules that determine the conditions and the extent of users’ access rights. As rules become more complex, analytical skills are required to identify conflicts and interactions within the rules that comprise a system policy—especially when rules are stateful and depend on event histories. Without adequate tool support such an analysis is error-prone and expensive. In consequence, many policy specifications are inconsistent or conflicting that render the system insecure. The security of the system, however, does not only depend on the correct specification of the security policy, but in a large part also on the correct interpretation of those rules by the system’s enforcement mechanism.

In this paper, we show how policy rules can be formalized in Fusion Logic, a temporal logic for the specification of behavior of systems. A symbolic decision procedure for Fusion Logic based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) is provided and we introduce a novel technique for the construction of enforcement mechanisms of access control policy rules that uses a BDD encoded enforcement automaton based on input traces which reflect state changes in the system. We provide examples of verification of policy rules, such as absence of conflicts, and dynamic separation of duty and of the enforcement of policies using our prototype implementation (FLCheck) for which we detail the underlying theory.

Keywords

Access control policy Policy enforcement Policy verification Binary decision diagram 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Software Technology Research LaboratoryDe Montfort UniversityLeicesterUK

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