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Foundations of Science

, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 641–653 | Cite as

Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames

  • Rafal UrbaniakEmail author
  • Frederik Van De Putte
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Abstract

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.

Keywords

Concepts Dynamic frames Single instance induction Induction 

Notes

Open Access

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012

Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and JournalismGdansk UniversityGdanskPoland
  2. 2.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent UniversityGhentBelgium

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