Foundations of Science

, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 385–390 | Cite as

Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man’

Reply

Abstract

The main suggestions and objections raised by Don Ihde and Charles Lenay to my ‘Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment’ are summarized and discussed. On the one hand, I agree that we should pay more attention to whole body experience and to further resisting Cartesian assumptions in the field of cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of cognition. On the other hand, I explain that my account in no way presupposes the myth of ‘natural man’ or of a natural, delineated body from before the fall into technology.

Keywords

Embodiment Technology Incorporation Extension 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Fine ArtsUniversity College GhentGhentBelgium
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and Moral ScienceGhent UniversityGhentBelgium

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