Foundations of Science

, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 353–370 | Cite as

The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws

Abstract

This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections. The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are contingent; (ii) this view cannot account for certain kinds of laws of nature and their properties.

Keywords

dispositions dispositionalism laws of nature natural necessity properties 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity Of BristolBristolU.K

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