Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

Original Paper

Abstract

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.

Keywords

Social preferences Relative performance Cooperation Leadership 

JEL Classification

M52 D03 C7 C9 

Supplementary material

10683_2017_9512_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (914 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 914 KB)

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pablo Hernandez-Lagos
    • 1
  • Dylan Minor
    • 2
  • Dana Sisak
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.New York University Abu DhabiAbu DhabiUnited Arab Emirates
  2. 2.Northwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA
  3. 3.Erasmus University RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands
  4. 4.Tinbergen InstituteRotterdamThe Netherlands

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