Coordination with communication under oath

  • Nicolas Jacquemet
  • Stéphane Luchini
  • Jason F. Shogren
  • Adam Zylbersztejn
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x

Cite this article as:
Jacquemet, N., Luchini, S., Shogren, J.F. et al. Exp Econ (2017). doi:10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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Abstract

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.

Keywords

Coordination game Cheap talk communication Oath 

JEL Classification

C72 D83 

Supplementary material

10683_2016_9508_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (127 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 127 KB)

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
Fondation Aix-Marseille Universite
  • “Mutual trust and commitment”

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicolas Jacquemet
    • 1
  • Stéphane Luchini
    • 2
  • Jason F. Shogren
    • 3
  • Adam Zylbersztejn
    • 4
  1. 1.Paris School of EconomicsUniversity Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneParisFrance
  2. 2.Centre de la Vieille CharitéGREQAM-CNRSMarseille Cedex 02France
  3. 3.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of WyomingLaramieUSA
  4. 4.GATE L-SE UMR 5824Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2EcullyFrance

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