Effect of an audience in public goods provision
- 715 Downloads
This paper investigates a novel public goods game where contributions to the public goods require effort that is observable. When the players are observed, they exert more effort to contribute to the public goods, and free-riding diminishes significantly compared to the no observer case. These effects are absent when no effort is required in order to contribute to the public goods. Furthermore, in the presence of an audience, the contributions to the public goods do not diminish when the game is repeated in the effort-required environment. Being observed does not affect the performance of the players if there is no strategic aspect of the game, in other words, when they play a private goods game. These results indicate that an individual wants to avoid appearing lazy when her effort helps the society.
KeywordsPublic goods Observable effort Experiment Social image
JEL ClassificationA13 C92 D03 D64
We would like to thank Rachel Croson, Elif Incekara Hafalir, Lise Vesterlund, and seminar participants at the University of Pittsburgh for many useful comments and feedback. We thank Ozlem Tonguc and Danyan Zha for their competent research assistance.
- Berkowitz, L. (1972). Social norms, feelings, and other factors affecting helping and altruism. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, New York: Academic Press. Google Scholar
- Broucek, F. J. (1991). Shame and the Self. New York: The Guilford Press. Google Scholar
- Glazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (1996). A signaling explanation for charity. The American Economic Review, 86(4), 1019–1028. Google Scholar
- Grossman, Z. (2010). Self-signaling versus social-signaling in giving. Mimeo. Google Scholar
- Harbaugh, W. T. (1998a). The prestige motive for charitable transfers. The American Economic Review, 88(2), 277–282. Google Scholar
- Hollander, H. (1990). A social exchange approach to voluntary contribution. The American Economic Review, 80, 1157–1167. Google Scholar
- Loewenstein, G., Read, D., & Baumeister, R. (2003). Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Google Scholar
- Nathanson, D. (1987). The shame/pride axis. In H. B. Lewis (Ed.), The Role of Shame in Symptom Formation, Hillsdale: Erlbaum. Google Scholar
- Soetevent, A. R. (2011). Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity: evidence from a field experiment. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(1), 180–205. Google Scholar
- Tadelis, S. (2008). The power of shame and the rationality of trust. Mimeo. Google Scholar
- Yao, D. (2006). Microsoft-designed school opens in Philadelphia, Associated Press Newswires, September. http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/sotf/default.mspx.