Experimental Economics

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 399–411 | Cite as

An experimental analysis of team production in networks

  • Enrique Fatas
  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
  • Hector Solaz
Article

Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. This paper tests the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team work environment under four different organizational networks: the line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete network. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.

Keywords

Team production Networks Information 

JEL Classification

C92 H41 

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enrique Fatas
    • 1
  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
    • 3
  • Hector Solaz
    • 1
  1. 1.LINEEXUniversidad de ValenciaValenciaSpain
  2. 2.ERI-CES Edificio InstitutosValenciaSpain
  3. 3.Departamento de Teoría e Historia EconómicaUniversidad de MálagaMálagaSpain

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