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Experimental Economics

, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 334–345 | Cite as

Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach

  • Charles BellemareEmail author
  • Luc Bissonnette
  • Sabine Kröger
Article

Abstract

We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.

Keywords

Partial identification Preferences Beliefs Decision making under uncertainty Investment game 

JEL Classification

C81 

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Bellemare
    • 1
    Email author
  • Luc Bissonnette
    • 2
  • Sabine Kröger
    • 1
  1. 1.Département d’économiqueUniversité LavalQuébecCanada
  2. 2.Department of Econometrics and ORTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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