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Experimental Economics

, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 249–259 | Cite as

Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

  • Dirk EngelmannEmail author
  • Hans-Theo Normann
Article

Abstract

We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.

Keywords

Minimum-effort game Coordination game Experiment Social capital 

JEL Classification

C72 C91 C92 

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Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUK
  2. 2.Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)Düsseldorf UniversityDüsseldorfGermany

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