Experimental Economics

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 488–503 | Cite as

The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Article

Abstract

Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.

Keywords

Corruption Economic experiment Social preferences 

JEL Classification

D73 C91 Z13 

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Supplementary material

10683_2009_9225_MOESM1_ESM.doc (34 kb)
Experimental Scripts Game description. (DOC 33 kB)
10683_2009_9225_MOESM2_ESM.doc (93 kb)
Data form for the Public Official. (DOC 93 kB)

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for the Study of African EconomiesUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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