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Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game

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Abstract

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25–37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN, 47907-2056, USA

    Timothy N. Cason

  2. Department of Economics, Monash University, P.O. Box 11E, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia

    Vai-Lam Mui

Authors
  1. Timothy N. Cason
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  2. Vai-Lam Mui
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Correspondence to Timothy N. Cason.

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Cason, T.N., Mui, VL. Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game. Exp Econ 10, 251–267 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1

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