Experimental Economics

, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 305–316

Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests


DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9180-2

Cite this article as:
Carare, O., Haruvy, E. & Prasad, A. Exp Econ (2007) 10: 305. doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9180-2


We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show that the value of K affects initial submissions and convergence to equilibrium. When K is small relative to the number of participants, our experiments show that repeated play converges to or near zero. When K is large, an equilibrium is often not reached as a result of repeated play. We seek explanations to these patterns in hierarchical thinking and direction learning.


Coordination games Rank order contests Learning Hierarchical thinking Experiments 


C92 D83 

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Octavian Carare
    • 1
  • Ernan Haruvy
    • 1
  • Ashutosh Prasad
    • 1
  1. 1.School of ManagementUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA

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