Experimental Economics

, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 305–316

Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9180-2

Cite this article as:
Carare, O., Haruvy, E. & Prasad, A. Exp Econ (2007) 10: 305. doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9180-2

Abstract

We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show that the value of K affects initial submissions and convergence to equilibrium. When K is small relative to the number of participants, our experiments show that repeated play converges to or near zero. When K is large, an equilibrium is often not reached as a result of repeated play. We seek explanations to these patterns in hierarchical thinking and direction learning.

Keywords

Coordination games Rank order contests Learning Hierarchical thinking Experiments 

JEL

C92 D83 

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Octavian Carare
    • 1
  • Ernan Haruvy
    • 1
  • Ashutosh Prasad
    • 1
  1. 1.School of ManagementUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA

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