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Experimental Economics

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 336–343 | Cite as

Voice matters in a dictator game

  • Tetsuo YamamoriEmail author
  • Kazuhiko Kato
  • Toshiji Kawagoe
  • Akihiko Matsui
Article

Abstract

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

Keywords

Communication Voice Dictator game Economic experiment 

JEL

C72 C91 D64 

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Supplementary material

10683_2007_9168_MOESM1_ESM.doc (330 kb)
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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tetsuo Yamamori
    • 1
    Email author
  • Kazuhiko Kato
    • 2
  • Toshiji Kawagoe
    • 3
  • Akihiko Matsui
    • 4
  1. 1.Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Graduate School of EconomicsUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsAsia UniversityTokyoJapan
  3. 3.Department of Complex SystemsFuture University–HakodateHokkaidoJapan
  4. 4.Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan

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