Experimental Economics

, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 71–77 | Cite as

Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

  • Sigrid SuetensEmail author
  • Jan Potters
Open Access


On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.


Collusion Quantity-choice and price-choice experiments 


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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of AntwerpAntwerpBelgium
  2. 2.Tilburg University, CentERTilburgThe Netherlands

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