Experimental Economics

, Volume 9, Issue 1, pp 53–66 | Cite as

Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners

Article

Abstract

We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner.

Keywords

Methodology Experiment Trust game Beliefs Internet 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Social SciencesUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardson
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceRice UniversityBoston

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