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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 993–1015 | Cite as

What’s Wrong with Designing People to Serve?

  • Bartek ChomanskiEmail author
Article
  • 224 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper I argue, contrary to recent literature, that it is unethical to create artificial agents possessing human-level intelligence that are programmed to be human beings’ obedient servants. In developing the argument, I concede that there are possible scenarios in which building such artificial servants is, on net, beneficial. I also concede that, on some conceptions of autonomy, it is possible to build human-level AI servants that will enjoy full-blown autonomy. Nonetheless, the main thrust of my argument is that, in building such artificial agents, their creators cannot help but evince an objectionable attitude akin to the Aristotelian vice of manipulativeness.

Keywords

Autonomy Artificial intelligence Manipulativeness Robot ethics 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I have benefitted from discussing the ideas contained in this paper with Arden Ali, John Basl, Kay Mathiesen, Ron Sandler, Ben Yelle, as well I have benefitted from discussing the ideas contained in this paper with Arden Ali, John Basl, Kay Mathiesen, Ron Sandler, Ben Yelle, as well as the students in my Technology and Human Values courses at Northeastern University. I am also grateful to two reviewers for this journal for many insightful comments and suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and ReligionNortheastern UniversityBostonUSA

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