Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 121–136 | Cite as

Why Do We Disagree about our Obligations to the Poor?

  • Peter SeipelEmail author


People disagree about whether individuals in rich countries like the United States have an obligation to aid the world’s poorest people. A tempting thought is that this disagreement comes down to a non-moral matter. I argue that we should be suspicious of this view. Drawing on psychological evidence, I show that we should be more pessimistic about our ability to attribute the disagreement to a difference in factual beliefs.


Moral disagreement Non-moral disagreement Empirical explanation Famine relief Peter Singer 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of South Carolina LancasterLancasterUSA

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