Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 21, Issue 4, pp 979–996 | Cite as

Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value

  • Timothy Perrine


This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its pitfalls.


Basic final value Michael Zimmerman Non-basic final value Intrinsic value Pro-attitudes 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyWuhan UniversityWuhanChina

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