Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 18, Issue 5, pp 1011–1025 | Cite as

How Neuroscience Can Vindicate Moral Intuition



Utilitarianism Moral psychology Moral intuitions 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCollege of William and MaryWilliamsburgUSA

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