Critical Discussion of David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013. Pp. x +109. Price: £12.95.
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Foundations for Moral Relativism consists of five self-standing, though loosely related, essays on the nature of agency and its metaethical foundations. The essays do not aspire to offer any grand theory of agency or metaethics, but only to lay out some of the foundations for such theories. These foundations portray how agency in general is constructed in the social context of a community, how moral agency in particular is constructed in the social context of a community, and how a derivative relativist account of morality can be not only intellectually respectable but also plausible. In paving the way for moral relativism, Velleman clarifies popular confusions about relativism, responds to a number of traditional objections and sketches a sophisticated version of moral relativism that is meant to improve on more simplistic versions.
There is much to praise in these thought provoking essays and they are highly recommended to anyone working on agency and metaethics. They are lucid,...
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