What Carroll’s Tortoise Actually Proves
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Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.
KeywordsRationality Attitude Obligation Regress Carroll Tortoise
I am grateful to: Erik Weber and the referees of the journal for extensive feedback. The author is PhD fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders.
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