Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle
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- Carlson, E. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2013) 16: 449. doi:10.1007/s10677-012-9352-9
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John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.