Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 449–463 | Cite as

Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle

Article

Abstract

John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.

Keywords

Value comparisons “Better than” Vagueness Incomparability John Broome Cristian Constantinescu 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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