Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 171–179 | Cite as

The Distinctive Wrong in Lying

  • Alan StrudlerEmail author


In this essay I will argue, as does Bernard Williams, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach a trust. I will also argue, contrary to Williams, that lying and misleading threaten trust differently, and that when they are wrong, they are wrong differently. Indeed, lying may be wrong when misleading is not.


Lying Mislead Trust 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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