Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 397–411 | Cite as

On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes

  • Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen


Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued that one of these kinds is particularly difficult to include in an analysis of value simpliciter but not in an analysis of value for.


Personal value Intentional content Fitting attitude Buck-passing Love Admiration Sake Universalizability Good for 



This paper has benefited much from the comments I received from the people who attended the workshop Kinds of Value and Kinds of Value Bearers at ECAP6 (Krakow). I would like to thank in particular Christian Piller and Wlodek Rabinowicz who gave me valuable remarks on the manuscript. I also owe Johan Brännmark, Kevin Mulligan, Jonas Olson, Andrew Reisner, and Michael J. Zimmerman a special thanks for useful and stimulating discussions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lund UniversityLundSweden

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