Ethics and Information Technology

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 181–189 | Cite as

Privacy and perfect voyeurism

Original Paper

Abstract

I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism, covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some thoughts on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm.

Keywords

Autonomy Harm Privacy Surveillance Utilitarianism Voyeurism Wrong 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyJohn Jay College of Criminal JusticeNew YorkUSA

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