Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?
Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
F. J. Boge was employed with the research unit The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider (German Research Foundation (DFG); grant FOR 2063) while working on this paper, and hence acknowledges the funding. We otherwise thank Richard Healey and John DeBrota for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Chris Fuchs for discussions on the subject at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study.
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