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Erkenntnis

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Composition as Identity, Universalism, and Generic Quantifiers

  • Edward FallsEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

Composition as Identity (CAI) is, roughly, the thesis that the parts of a whole, taken collectively, are in some sense identical with the whole. Einar Duenger Bohn argues for Universalism from CAI. Universalism says that composition is totally unrestricted: wherever two or more objects occur, an instance of composition occurs, however unnatural or gerrymandered. Bohn’s argument relies on inferences with generic quantifiers, but he does not provide a clear account of generic quantification. My argument is that on the most plausible approach to thinking about such inferences, the argument fails.

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TennesseeKnoxvilleUSA

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