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Erkenntnis

pp 1–18 | Cite as

What Should we Believe About Free Will?

  • Jeremy ByrdEmail author
Original Research
  • 36 Downloads

Abstract

Given the available evidence, I argue that we face considerable uncertainty about free will. In particular, I argue that the available philosophical evidence does not support being highly confident in our theories about the nature of free will, though this does not necessarily mean that we should suspend judgment about either incompatibilism or compatibilism. For those who accept incompatibilism, however, I argue that there is enough uncertainty about libertarian free will that they should suspend judgment about whether we are ever free, if not reject free will entirely. While I do not claim that compatibilists should be similarly agnostic about the existence of free will, I argue that most compatibilist theories are subject to considerable uncertainty as well, so that most compatibilists should be agnostic about how often we act freely. I conclude with a brief discussion of how we might address these issues going forward.

Notes

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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tarrant County CollegeFort WorthUSA

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