Free Will and Two Local Determinisms
Hudson (A materialist metaphysics of the human person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, The metaphysics of hyperspace, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) has formulated two local deterministic theses and argued that both are incompatible with freedom. We argue that Hudson has half the story right. Moreover, reflection on Hudson’s theses brings out an important point for debates about freedom generally: that instead of focusing on the notion of entailment, debates about freedom should focus on the notions of explanation and sourcehood. Hudson’s theses provide an excellent case study for why the latter notions ought to take precedence over the former in debates about freedom.
- Abbott, E. (1884). Flatland. In The Annotated Flatland: A romance of many dimensions, introduction and notes by Ian Stewart. Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002.Google Scholar
- Fischer, J. M., & Todd, P. (Eds.). (2015). Freedom, fatalism, and foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Hudson, H. (2001). A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
- Tognazzini, N. (2016). Free will and time travel. In M. Griffith, N. Levy, & K. Timpe (Eds.), The Routledge companion to free will (pp. 680–690). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
- van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Wasserman, R. (n.d.) Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence.Google Scholar