, Volume 84, Issue 5, pp 1011–1023 | Cite as

Free Will and Two Local Determinisms

  • Andrew LawEmail author
  • Neal A. Tognazzini


Hudson (A materialist metaphysics of the human person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001, The metaphysics of hyperspace, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) has formulated two local deterministic theses and argued that both are incompatible with freedom. We argue that Hudson has half the story right. Moreover, reflection on Hudson’s theses brings out an important point for debates about freedom generally: that instead of focusing on the notion of entailment, debates about freedom should focus on the notions of explanation and sourcehood. Hudson’s theses provide an excellent case study for why the latter notions ought to take precedence over the former in debates about freedom.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, RiversideRiversideUSA
  2. 2.Western Washington UniversityBellinghamUSA

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