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Erkenntnis

pp 1–12 | Cite as

The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

  • Sanford Goldberg
  • Jonathan Matheson
Original Research
  • 60 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of North FloridaJacksonvilleUSA

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