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Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit from Theories of Epistemic Justification

  • Gordian HaasEmail author
Original Research


Belief revision theories aim to model the dynamics of epistemic states. Besides beliefs, epistemic states comprise most importantly justificational structures. Typically, belief revision theories, however, model the dynamics of beliefs while neglecting justificational structures over and above logical relations. Despite some awareness that this approach is problematic, how devastating the consequences of this neglect are has not yet been fully grasped. In this paper, I argue that taking justificational structures into account could solve four well-known problems of belief revision.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für PhilosophieUniversität BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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