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Erkenntnis

, Volume 84, Issue 6, pp 1325–1340 | Cite as

Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint

  • Michael BertrandEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

It is often thought that metaphysical grounding underwrites a distinctive sort of metaphysical explanation. However, it would be a mistake to think that all metaphysical explanations are underwritten by metaphysical grounding. In service of this claim, I offer a novel kind of metaphysical explanation called metaphysical explanation by constraint, examples of which have been neglected in the literature. I argue that metaphysical explanations by constraint are not well understood as grounding explanations.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Marc Lange, L.A. Paul, Thomas Hofweber, Ram Neta, Finnur Delsen, Alexander Skiles, and audiences at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Hope College, and the 3rd annual meeting of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science. Special thanks to an excellent referee for this journal.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentAuburn UniversityAuburnUSA

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