On the Pareto Condition on Permissible Belief
Thomas Kroedel has recently proposed an interesting Pareto-style condition on permissible belief. Despite the condition’s initial plausibility, this paper aims at providing a counterexample to it. The example is based on the view that a proper condition on permissible belief should not give permission to believe a proposition that undermines one’s belief system or whose epistemic standing decreases in the light of one’s de facto beliefs.
I would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Roman Heil, Thomas Kroedel, Patricia Rich and Moritz Schulz for helpful comments. Special thanks to Thomas Kroedel for taking the time to discuss some of my questions in detail and for encouraging me to submit this short paper. I am also indebted to three anonymous referees whose remarks helped me to improve this paper. This work was funded by Grant SCHU 3080/3-1 to Moritz Schulz from the DFG as part of the Emmy-Noether-Group Knowledge and Decision.