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Erkenntnis

, Volume 84, Issue 1, pp 41–55 | Cite as

Gunky Objects, Junky Worlds, and Weak Mereological Universalism

  • Deborah C. SmithEmail author
Critical Discussion
  • 77 Downloads

Abstract

Einar Bohn has argued that principles of composition must be contingent if gunky objects and junky worlds are both metaphysically possible. This paper critically examines such a case for contingentism about composition. I argue that weak mereological universalism, the principle that any two objects compose something, is consistent with the metaphysical possibility of both gunky objects and junky worlds. I further argue that, contra A. J. Cotnoir, the weak mereological universalist can accept a plausible mereological remainder axiom. The proponent of contingent composition will have to look elsewhere for an argument in favor of his position.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKent State UniversityKentUSA

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